Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/48

 �This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 the frequent inclusion in thi legislation of funds for lend-lease, such funds being gen- erally included m the regular mllxtary tablishment appropnatmn bills and m the supplemental national defense appropria- tlon bills. The Second Supplemental Na- tional Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, ap- proved 28 October 1941, provided $685,000,- 00O m lend-lease funds for aircraft and aero- nautical materials. . The Third Supple- mental Appropriation Act for 1942 allowed $2,000,000,000 of the funds appropriated for the mhtar establishment to be used for lend.lease purposes. as The Fourth Supplemental Appropnatxon Act for 1942, which prowdeal for a 500,000 airplane program, provided that as much as $4,000,000,000 of this sum could be transferred to lend-lease.  At this time it was estimated by Under Secretary of War Patterson that 50 per cent of the military aircraft production of the U S. was going to foreign countries General Arnold pomted out that the planes for export were those produced under defense aid (lend-lease), under British and other contracts, plus 15 per cent of the tarcraft produced under Army contracts. Arnold sad that the AAF had sacrificed urgently needed planes in order to provide the greatest aid possible. The ShXth Supplemental Appropriation Act for 1942 carried $2,200,000,000 for lend- lease from Army funds, a httle more than one-half of this being for the AAF The military establishment apprepriatmn bill for 1943 allowed the use of the funds either for lend-lease or for Army requirements. The sum of $12,00,000,0D0 was approved for the xtem but no breakdown of the fund for use by the various arms was under- taken. s In 1943 lend-lease shipments of A-20's to Russm to meet that country's pressing needs delayed the commitment of three light bombardment squadrons for two months each, and deIayed the completion of the whole hght bombardment program for a m0nth. S In the same year, General Arnold wrote a memorandum for the Chief of Staff in winch he warned that any in- crease in lend-lease allocations would re- sult in the curtailment of aircraft sorely needed for AAF purposes and might in- definitely protract the completion of proper training for khe personnel of the 23-group program. This, according to General Ar- nold, would have a most serious effect on the heavy bomber operations of the AAF.  The 1944 military establishment bill sought $4,969,96,668 for lend-lease, but only $37,637,080 of this was for the AAF. By 31 January 1944 a total of $2,158,360,- 645.0õ had been allocated ior lend-tease air- craft and aeronautical eqmpment and $2,- 138,184,06.66 had been obligated. as Despxte delays m and interruption of its training and matoriel expanmon programs, the AAF, m the long run, benefited greatly from the foreign sales, foreign orders, and lend-lease. In 1938, 1939, and 1940, foreign orders (especially those by the French and the British) provided the great stimulus which started the large-scale development of the American arcraft and aircraft en- gine industries. Also, a a result of defer- ring dehveries until more pressing foreign needs had been satisfied, the AAF was en- abled to take advantage of vicarious com- bat experience and to secure aircraft of superior performance. Then, too, the lend- !ease policy fitted into the general strategy of the AAF by helping to create and hold bases which could later be used by Ameri- can air forces--and by lend-lease the United States was able to give great axd to friendly nations and more fully identify xtself with those countrms fightng the Axis powers. There is no doubt that lend-lease was a factor (m morale as well as material) in bringing about the defeat of the Axis countries. Certainly no complaint can be made of neglect of the Army air arm by Congress during the period 1939-45. Rarely did it show any hesitation to grant the funds re- quested by the AAF. Even in the late thir- ties when the Army air arm was in the drums and suffered from lack of adequate funds, the responsibihty rested on the War Department and the Bureau of the Budget rather than on Congress. They reduced the Air Corps cshmates before they ever eached Congress--- fact, Congress voted more money than was requested in the fiscal THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958