Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/43

 �This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 CHAPTER LEGISLATION DURING THE WAR YEARS The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or 7 December 1041 found the AAF still con- siderably short o/ its expansion goals, but it was taking measures to deploy to the best advantage the limited number of air umts at ts disposal. As General Arnold sad, "we had plans but not planes " Planning for a common srategy on the part of the United States and Great Britain began in January 1941 when American and British staff representatives met m Wash- Lugton. On 27 March 1941, they submitted a report of an over-alI strategic plan by which the United States and the British Commonwealth could defeat Germany and her alhes (it was a basic assumption of the plan that /or the Urnted States to go to war with Germany would certainly revolve Italy nd probably Japan). This plan, ABC-1, described the nussions of the sev- eral services in general terms, and set as its air policy the achievement, as soon as possible, of "superiority of mr strength over that of the enemy, particularly m long- range sriking forces," Untrod States air orces in the aeific and the Far East were to be held to a minimum, with the bulk of the available units concentrated m the Western Hmisphere and the offensive strik- Lug force set up ior the bombardment of Germany from bases in the United King- dom. Since 1989 the War Plans Division had been working on five basic war plans for possible use against our potential enemies. Each assumed a dzfferent situation and course of actaon; each earned the generic code name of RAINBOW and ts own nu- merical designation. RAINBOW No. 5 best fitted in wth the strateEy outlined in the ß Jrdted States-British staff conferences; hence this plan was worked out in detml 36 in the spnng of 1941 and approved by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy on 14 May and within three weeks by the Secre- taries of War and Navy.* The AAF asked for 2,164,916 men and some 60,000 combat planes in order to cary out the missran assigned to it m ABC-1. Ths reques was accompanmd by a dotruled and carefully documented operational plan, AWPD/1, drawn up by the newly formed Air War Plans Dinsion. A number of officers contributed to the plan, but the actual document was drawn up by a committee consieging of Col. Harold L George, divi- sion chief, Lt. Col. Kenneth N. Walker, Ma 3. Laurence S. Kuter, and Maj. PIaywood S. Hansell, Jr., who were apparently chiefly responsible or the strategic concepts. This plan was worked out in accord- ance with the principles of ABC-1 and the al]ocations of tasks m RAINBOW No. 5.  Thus, lot the first tme in its lnstory, the United States entered a war with a care. ully conceived strategic plan. The AAF wa not up to its planned strength when the Pearl Harbor attack came, nor could it man any of ats overseas bases with a force adequate to fulfill ]t mission, lut it was rapidly building up its strength, how- ever, and as a result of the strategac plans discussed above, its air units were deployed m accordance with an over-all scheme of action which would be proved sound by the war. a Wath the entrance of the Uted States into the war there was a great antenmfica- taon of the expansion of the AAF, as well as of the other services, so as to put them on a war footang. This entailed a great in- the aumpions, te over-all tTateBy, and the prclp]es governing rtcgio direction nd [heater command 'c the THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958
 * RAINBOW Nc 5 accepted all the major hc3es