Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/32

 �This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 Azr Force disorder which had erosted in the manu- facture (and procurement) of mutations m the U.S., a mtuation m which about a dozen purchamng mmions from yamcue countries had been trying to buy arms m our market. They had been competing wth each other and wth us, and ths competition had pro- duced delay  Although there was now a mbre orderly system of allocating arcraft productton between the Urnted States and fnendly powers, the lend-lease program nevertheless made t progresmvely more difficult for the Army Ar Forces to procure the aircraft necessary to implement its ex- pansion program. In June 1941 Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, stated that the 25-group program (whtch now constituted the first step toward a modified 54-group program) was at least four months behind as a result of the deferrnent of matoriel to the needs of the British2  The Air Corps procurement situation was still further complicated by the entrance of Rusma the war m June of 1941 and the subsequent extenmon of lend-lease aid to that country. The policy which came to be fo]lowed m the' silocarton of tarcraft production under the lend-lease program called or the alloca- tion of planes where they could be used most effectvely--this, of course, was in combat. Hence, the Ar Corps had to defer the full reahzatmn of ts 54-group prograin to the extent that areraft it had ordered were made available under lend-lease for use by Great Britain in the mr oftenrove against Germany, and by the Rueroans n repelling German mvamon. Although a g- gantic effort was made to increase produc- tion to meet all these needs, the AAF found itself on the very eve of war working under an allocation system which made impostable the early achievement of its 54-group pro- gram. This state of affairs contributed very largely to the lack of complete preparedness of the AAF on M-Day. u INVESTIGATIVI= ACTION TAKEN BY CONGRES Although the Army air arm had not at- tarried the goals of the expanmon program when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the great increase m arcraft production since the beginning of 1939 had been suffi- cient to give substantml md to Great Bnt- mn and to bmld up the Air Corps to a strength which allowed it to absorb its mtal losses and to begin a lmted offen- sive m less than a year. A malor portion of the credit for making thts achmvement poe- ruble must be attributed to the actran taken by Congress m the enactment of the nec- sa legislation. Congress also contributed to the development af American mr power through the exermse of ts investigative powers. Congress established several committees to investigate the caring on of the war effort, the most powerful, comprehemive, d eftochre of which was e so-called Tan Comttee.* Thi committee gave an mpreve example of the consuctive contmbution the legrelative branch can make to the successful management of a war program. e Truman Cottee grew out of he anxiety felt by Congress regarding the pn- ning and admmstratmn of defense mobh- zaton m the year preceding Pearl Harbor when billions were berg spent in a hastRy orgamzed defense program. As the got under way, Congress was flooded with complaints of extravagance, waste, profi coring, avoritmm m awarding contrts, and  aost complete fafiure to utihze the Iamhtms of small busness. My mem- bers of Congress feared hat the great raze and maldmtmbutmn of the tremendous renee expenditures would change our economy for the worse. They also feared the pohtmal consequences of a pubhc opin- mn aroused by the shandhng of drYtees or equippg them with delecive weapons or machines2  Senator Har S Truman took the initia- tive m estabhshmg thin committee as a re- suit of a trip late m 1940 m whmh he in- spooled war ndustrms in hs own state and along the way on s return to Washington. He arnved there with an preon of waste and insufficient plning on the pa of the War and Navy DepartmenB and other enmes responmble for the mobiza- ton effort, Feeling that both public opinion THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958