Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/17

 �This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 definitive legislation on tlans subleer was en- acted until 1947. Meanwhile, m the period 1935-1941, Congress enacted several meas- ures which increased the personnel and matoriel trength of the ar ann. At first the legislation was mainly for the purpose of implementrag the Army regulation es- tablishing the GHQ Air Force. Later Con- gress, as a result of the outbreak of World War IIm 1939, enacted legislation expand- ing the Army air arm as a part of the over- all program of mfitary preparedness. The acts of August 12, 1935, June 16, 1936, and June 24, 1936, as previously out- I/ned, implemented the establishment of the GHQ Air Force and authorized sub. stantial mcreases in personnel and equip- ment for the Ar Corps. The Act of June 24, 1936, in partmular, authorized an Air Corps of 2,320 serviceable planes; this increase was designated specifically for the purpose of meeting the mcreased demands for per- sonnel and eqmpment caused by the recent activation of the GHQ Ar Force. Despite this legislation, however, the Air Corps was unable to secure the funds to purchase the planes and equipment necessary to bring the Kit Corps up to the authorized strength. In planning to attain the 2,320-plane ob- jective the Air Corps submitted estimates of approximately $100,000,000 for the fiscal year 1938, but the War Department Budget Advisory Committee reduced these esti- mates by about $13,000,000 and the final appropriation by Congress was only slightly more than $77,000,000J 0 It is interesting to observe that the final appropriation was about $10,000,000 less than the final revised estimate of the Budget Advisory Commit. tee, which was rather unusual as the outs were generally made by the War Depart. merit and the Budget Bureau. A study of the over-all picture of military appropriatxons in the thirties shows that while Congress was usually generous to the Am Corps, it must share with the Bureau of the Budget (representing the President) and the War Department the responsibility ior the allocation to the Air Corps of in- sufficient unds to procure the planes and equipment necessary to bring it up to its authorized strength.* During the thirties Congress was averse to increasing military appropriations beyond the President's budg- ets and was, on the whole, content to check the mihtary estimates and to alter them only moderately. o Even so, presidential es- tnnates for expansion ot enlMted strength and mlitary mateiel tended to be less than appropriations. Although the President ad- vocated a great increase n our air power in 199, it was not until 1940, the cnticaI year which saw the dsastrous Battle of France and the threat of complete German victory in the west, that the President's military budget estimates began to be deter- mined on the basis of the Amy's actua[ needs and the capacity of the nation's in- dustrios to absorb appropriations2 The progressive deterioration of the inter- natsons! situation and the gathering war clouds in Europe in 1939 finally brought Congress and the President to take actaon leading to a really substantial increase of American air power in recogmtion of importance to national defense. The out- break of World War II in September of 1939 soon justified the action of Congress and the President, and the spectacular vic- tories won by the Nms n the spring and summer of 1940 brought the threat of war even closer to the Unite States, making it apparent that a great additional bald-up of air power was essential to national curity. The demands of Butare and France and their allies for military aircraœt greatly stimulated American arcraft production in 1940, a development which eventually con- tributed greatly to the expansion of Amer- ican air power, although ts mmediate ef- fect was to create difficulties in carrying out the Air Corps expansion program by forcing the Air Corps, under the lend-lease program, to share with foreign buyers in the procurement o military mrcrat. The German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941 and the extension of lend-lease to meet Soviet requiremenM for mfiitary aircraft added to theze difficulties. Although tkns mtuataon made it impossible for the Air =For example, the goel of the five.year Dropram of 1926 :as no attained and was still fr rvm fulfi[lmen even in 193 See bove, p O THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958