Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 2.djvu/84

 itself, and in being so is an affirmative co-relation or connection of the Absolute, of the good and true, of the Infinite with that which is called the finite.

The affirmative connection in the earlier forms of religion exists in part only in this pure absorption, in which the subject says, “I am Brahma,” but it is an absolutely abstract connection, which only exists by means of this stupefaction, this relinquishment of all concrete actuality of Spirit, by means of negation. This affirmative connection is merely, as it were, a simple thread; for the rest, it is the abstract negative, this sacrifice, this self-immolation; that is to say, instead of connection there is merely flight from the concrete.

But with this affirmative connection, where determinate existence is taken up into universality, it is stated that things themselves are good; the Good is present Substance in them, and that which is good is their life, their affirmative Being. So far as they remain good, they belong to this realm of the Good; they are from the very first received into favour; it is not that a part only are these twice-born, as in India. On the contrary, the finite is composed of what is good, and is good. And, indeed, good is taken in the proper sense, and is understood with reference to an external end, an external comparison. That is in accordance with an end which is good for something, so that the end lies outside of the object. Here, on the other hand, good is to be understood as meaning that it is the Universal determined within itself. Good is so determined within itself; the particular things are good, they serve their own purpose, are adequate to themselves, not merely to an Other. The Good is not for them a “Beyond,”—Brahma again.

3. This Good, although it is indeed subjective itself, is inherently determined as Good, and is commensurate with substantial unity, with Universality itself, yet this determination is itself still abstract. The Good is concrete within itself, and yet this determinate existence of