Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 2.djvu/310

 demand for what is highest is implicitly stated in it, namely, the union of what has pure Being in itself and of particular ends; but the union here is of the ungodly, undivine, crude sort just described.

B.

THIS RELIGION AS IT APPEARS OUTWARDLY IN HISTORY IS REPRESENTED BY THE ROMAN RELIGION.

It is customary to take in a superficial way the Roman religion along with the Greek religion; but the spirit of the one is essentially different from that of the other. Even if they possess certain outward forms in common, still these occupy quite a different place in the religion we are dealing with; and the religions as a whole, and the religious sentiment connected with them, are essentially different, as is indeed already evident from an external, superficial, and empirical examination of them.

It is allowed in a general way that the State, the constitution of a State, the political destiny of any people, depends on its religion, that this is the basis, the substance of its actual spiritual life and the foundation of what we call its politics. The Greek and Roman spirit, culture, and character are, however, wholly and essentially different, and this fact must of itself bring us to the difference in the religions which form the substance of these.

The divine Beings belonging to this circle of thought are practical and not theoretical gods; prosaic, not poetical; although, as we shall presently see, this stage is the richest of all in the constantly new discovery and production of gods.

I. So far as regards abstract religious sentiment and spiritual tendencies, the earnestness of the Romans is what first calls for remark. Where one end exists, and that an essentially solid one which has to be realised, the understanding referred to comes into play, and along with