Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 2.djvu/195

 The characteristics indicated are certainly characteristics of the Notion itself, but the subject which possesses them has not its real nature in them. The fundamental characteristics are the One and Power, and the Notion, the inmost nature of the subject, is posited as still existing independently of the attributes. If they really belonged to it, then they would themselves be Totality, for the Notion is the absolute goodness, it shares with itself its own characteristics. In the case of their belonging to the Notion, it would be further implied that they themselves were the whole Notion, and thus it would be for the first time truly real; in which case, however, the Notion would be posited as Idea and the subject as Spirit, in which goodness and righteousness would be totalities.

But although goodness and righteousness contain the element of difference, they are not thought of as being the abiding character of Power. Power, on the contrary, is by its very nature what is without definite character, what is undetermined, i.e., it shows itself essentially powerful as against these very differences; its goodness passes over into righteousness, and vice versd. Each being posited for itself excludes the other, while the very nature of Power consists in this, that it simply does away with or cancels the determinateness.

Righteousness is the moment of negation, i.e., it makes manifest the nothingness of things. Righteousness thus understood is a characteristic, just as origination and passing away are in Siva. It simply expresses the general aspect of the process, the aspect of contingency, the nothingness of which is made plain. It does not express negation as an infinite return into self, which would be the characteristic of Spirit. Negation is here nothing more than righteousness.

(b.) The Form of the World.

The world thus regarded is prosaic; it exists essentially as a collection of things. In the East, and in Greek