Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 2.djvu/163

 been posited in any kind of way and has to be realised, then in so far as the subject together with its ends is something finite, is an immediate definite form of existence, the further characteristic of realisation lies outside of it. It is, looked at from one point of view, immediate, and in that case the subject, together with its ends, is immediate, and the aspect under which realisation presents itself is an external one, i.e., the realisation appears as material, as something which has been got outside, and serves simply to realise the end. It is, in fact, merely a means in reference to the end, and it is the latter which firmly maintains itself and is permanent. Being as an “Other,” Being in the aspect of reality, the material, is, as compared with the fixed end, something which has no independence of its own, has no actual Being, but is simply a means with no soul in it. The end is outside of it and is first impressed upon it by the activity of the subject, which realises itself in the material. External conformity to an end has thus an objectivity outside of it which has no independence, and in contrast to which the subject, together with its ends, is what is permanent. The material has no power to offer resistance, but is simply a means for the end which realises itself in it, and in the same way the realised end is itself merely an external form in the material, for this latter is something which has been immediately got, and is therefore dependent, though it is independent as well. In their union, therefore, both of them, means and end, remain external to one another. Wood and stones are means, but the realised end is equally wood and stones which have received a certain form; but all the same the material is still something external to the end.

2. Inner Conformity to an End.—This is the conformity which has its means in itself. Thus what has life is an end for itself, it makes itself into an end, and here the end is also the means. What has life is marked by this simple inwardness, which realises itself in its parts or