Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 2.djvu/147

 accordance with ends, then He is wise. Necessity is One also, and conformability to an end is present here also, only it lies outside of necessity. If conformability to an end is the fundamental characteristic, we have along with this the presence of the Power to carry out the ends, and the end itself is Fate. The point of difference simply is as to which of these determinations of the object is to be regarded as the Essence, and whether this latter is the One, or Necessity, or Power with its ends. The point of difference is simply as to which of them is to pass as the fundamental determination of the Essence for each religion.

What we have now to consider more definitely is the form in which these determinations appear as they have been connected with the proofs of the existence of God.

(a.) The Conception of the One.

Here we have not got to do with the proposition, God is only one; for it is implied in these words that the One is only a predicate of God; we have the subject, God, and a predicate outside of which He may have others in addition to this. That God is only One is a proposition which it is not difficult to prove. Being passes over into Essence, and this reflected into itself is what has been frequently called an Ens, or Individuum. When we say, God is the One, we mean something different from what was expressed formerly in the words, The Absolute Being is One, τὸ ἕν. Parmenides expressed it thus: Being alone is, or the One only is. This One, however, is only the abstract Infinite, not the Infinite as reflected into itself, and is thus rather the Immeasurable and Powerless, for it is the Infinite only as compared with actual existence in its infinitely manifold forms, and its existence is necessarily dependent on this relation. Power at first conceived of as the One is in reality the Universal posited as Power. The abstract One is the one side, and over against it is the manifoldness of the essence of the world. The concrete One, on