Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 1.djvu/273

 this collision are still very far from being brought into harmony.

This private sentiment or subjective conviction does not necessarily assume the form of religion; it may also continue in a more indefinite state. But amongst what we call “the people,” ultimate truth does not exist in the form of thought and principles. On the contrary, what will pass with the people as right or justice can hold this position only in so far as it has a definite, special character. Now this definite character of justice and morality has its ultimate verification for a people only in the form of an actually existing religion, and if this last is not essentially in harmony with the principles of freedom, there is always present a rent, and an unresolved division or dualism,—an antagonistic relation which ought not to exist in the State, of all places. Under Robespierre terror reigned in France, and this “terror” was directed against those who did not hold the sentiments of freedom, because they had fallen under suspicion—that is to say, because of the existence of this conviction or sentiment. In the same way the Ministry of Charles X. fell under suspicion. According to the formal principles of the constitution, the monarch was responsible to no one, but this formal principle did not hold its ground, and the dynasty was hurled from the throne. It thus becomes evident that even in the formally-matured constitution the ultimate sheet-anchor is still the general sentiment or feeling which has been put on one side in that constitution, and which now asserts itself in contempt of all form. It is from this contradiction, and from the prevailing insensibility to it, that our age is suffering.

Transition to the Following Section.

We have distinguished definite, limited worship from worship in the element of freedom, and thus have found