Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 1.djvu/261

 renounce his particular will, his passions and natural impulses. This may be understood as if the impulses of nature were to be eradicated, not merely purified—as if the vitality of the will were to be slain. This is wholly a mistake. What is true is that it is only the impure content that is to be purified; in other words, its content is to be made conformable to the moral will. It is a false demand, on the contrary, that is made when the renunciation is conceived of in an abstract way as if the impulse of vitality in itself were to be annulled. Possession, personal property, is likewise a part of what pertains to man; it is his by his own will; therefore it might now be demanded of him that he should relinquish his possession; celibacy is a demand of this kind. Freedom, conscience, belong also to man; in the same sense it may be required of him that he should give up his freedom, his will, in which case he sinks down into a gloomy, will-less creature. This is the extreme form of such a demand. Connected with this part of the subject is the idea that I should undo my deeds, and suppress the workings of evil action. Renunciation means here that I do not desire to regard certain deeds which I have committed as being my own, that I regard them as not having taken place, that is, I desire to repent of them. As regards time, it is true the action has passed by, so that it is nullified by time. But as to its inner content, in so far as it belongs to my will, it is still preserved in the inner sphere, and the destruction of it then means, relinquishment of the state of mind in which it exists ideally. If punishment be the destruction of the evil element in the sphere of reality, this destruction in the inner life is penitence and contrition, and the Spirit is able to accomplish this renunciation, since it has the energy to effect a change in itself, and to annul in itself the maxims and intentions of its will. If in this manner a man renounces his selfishness and the separation between himself and goodness, he then has become a