Page:League of Nations-Appeal by the Chinese Government.pdf/69

 of the great mass of evidence which was presented or collected, the Commission has come to the following conclusions:

Tense feeling undoubtedly existed between the Japanese and Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18th–19th, this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese, in accordance with the instructions referred to on page, had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorised attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10.30 p.m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and-was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence. In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence.

The narrative of the subsequent events must now be resumed.

On the night of September 18th, the Japanese troops in Manchuria were distributed as follows: In addition to the four Companies of the Battalion of Railway Guards which took part in the attack on the North Barracks, and the 29th Regiment of the 2nd Division under Colonel Hirata, which captured the Walled City of Mukden, already described, the rest of the 2nd Division was distributed in various places; the Headquarters of the 4th Regiment was at Changchun, of the 16th at Liaoyang, of the 30th at Port Arthur; other parts of these regiments were stationed at Antung, Yingkow, and at many smaller places on the Changchun-Mukden branch and the Antung-Mukden branch of the South Manchuria Railway. Another battalion of Railway Guards was at Changchun, and units of the Railway Guards and Gendarmerie were distributed with the 2nd Division in the smaller places already mentioned. Lastly, there were the garrison troops of Korea.

All the forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of September 18th over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur. Their total strength was as follows: 2nd Division, 5,400 men and 16 field-guns; Railway Guards about 5,000 men; Gendarmerie about 500. The Chinese troops at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang and other smaller towns were overcome and disarmed without resistance. The Railway Guards and Gendarmerie remained in these places, while the units of the 2nd Division at once concentrated at Mukden to take part in the more serious operations. The 16th and 30th Regiments arrived in time to join Colonel Hirata and assisted in the capture of the East Barracks. The 39th Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division (4,000 men and artillery) concentrated at 10 a.m. on the 19th at Shingishu on the Korean frontier, crossed the Yalu river on the 21st, and arrived at Mukden at midnight. From here detachments were sent to Liaoyuan and Hsinmin, which they occupied on the 22nd.

The Chinese Garrisons of Kuanchengtze and Nanling at Changchun, with an estimated strength of 10,000 men and 40 guns, were attacked on the night of September 18th by the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division and 1st Railway Guard Battalion stationed there (under Major-General Hasebe). Here, however, some resistance was shown by the Chinese. Fighting began at midnight. Nanling barracks were captured by 11 a.m. on the 19th, those of Kuanchengtze by 3 p.m. that day. The total Japanese casualties