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 through a hole in the wall. As soon as the attack began, the Chief of Staff gave orders for the lights to be extinguished, and again reported to General Wang I-Cheh by telephone. The latter replied that no resistance was to be offered. Distant artillery fire was heard at 10.30 o'clock p.m. from the south-west and north-west. At midnight, live shells began to fall inside the barracks. On reaching the south gate, the retreating troops of the 621st Regiment found that the Japanese were attacking that gate and that the guard was withdrawing. They accordingly took shelter in some trenches and earthworks until after the Japanese soldiers had passed through into the interior, when they were able to make their escape through the south gate and reached the village of Erhtaitze, to the north-east of the barracks, about 2 a.m. Other troops made their escape through the east gate and the empty barracks just outside the east wall, finally reaching the same village between 3 and 4 a.m.

The only resistance was offered by the 620th Regiment, quartered in the north-east corner building and the second building south of it. The commander of this regiment stated that, when the Japanese troops entered through the south gate at 1 a.m., the Chinese troops withdrew from one building to another, leaving the Japanese to attack empty buildings. After the main body of the Chinese troops had withdrawn, the Japanese turned eastwards and occupied the eastern exit. The 620th*Regiment thus found themselves cut off, and had no option but to fight their way through. They started to break through at 5 a.m., but did not get completely clear until 7 a.m. This was the only actual fighting that took place in the barracks and was responsible for most of the casualties. This regiment was the last to reach the village of Erhtaitze.

As soon as they were all assembled, the Chinese troops left the village in the early morning of the 19th for Tungling Station. From here they made their way to a village near Kirin, where they obtained a supply of winter clothing. Colonel Wang was sent to obtain permission from General Hsi Hsia for the troops to enter Kirin City. The Japanese residents at Kirin were so alarmed at the approach of the Chinese soldiers that reinforcements were at once sent from Changchun, Ssupingkai and Mukden to Kirin. Consequently, the Chinese turned back towards Mukden. They left their trains 13 miles outside Mukden, separated into nine groups, and marched round Mukden by night. To escape detection by the Japanese, General Wang I-Cheh himself rode through the town disguised as a peasant. In the morning, the Japanese obtained news of their presence and sent aeroplanes to bomb them. They were obliged to lie hidden by day, but continued their march at night. Eventually they reached a station on the Peiping-Mukden railway, and here they were able to order seven trains, which brought them to Shanhaikwan by October 4th.

Such are the two stories of the so-called incident of September 18th as they were told to the Commission by the participants on both sides. Clearly, and not unnaturally in the circumstances, they are different and contradictory.

Appreciating the tense situation and high feeling which had preceded this incident, and realising the discrepancies which are bound to occur in accounts of interested persons, especially with regard to an event which took place at night, the Commission, during its stay in the Far East, interviewed as many as possible of the representative foreigners who had been in Mukden at the time of the occurrences or soon after, including newspaper correspondents and other persons who had visited the scene of conflict shortly after the event, and to whom the first official Japanese account had been given. After a thorough consideration of such opinions, as well as of the accounts of the interested parties, and after a mature study of the considerable quantity of written material and a careful weighing