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 From 1925 onward, a definite change took place in the boycott organisation. The Kuomintang, having from its creation supported the movement, increased its control with each successive boycott until to-day it is the real organising, driving, co-ordinating and supervising factor in these demonstrations.

In doing this, the Kuomintang, as indicated by evidence in the possession of the Commission, did not dismiss the associations which had hitherto been responsible for the direction of boycott movements. It rather coordinated their efforts, systematised and made uniform their methods, and put unreservedly behind the movement the moral and material weight of its powerful party organisation. Having branches all over the country, possessing vast propaganda and information services, and inspired by a strong nationalistic sentiment, it rapidly succeeded in organising and stimulating a movement which had, up to that time, been somewhat sporadic. As a consequence, the coercive authority of the organisers of the boycotts over the merchant and the general public became stronger than ever before, although at the same time a fair margin of autonomy and initiative was left to the individual boycott associations.

The boycott rules continued to vary according to local conditions, but, parallel with the strengthening of the organisation, the methods employed by the Boycott Societies became more uniform, more strict and effective. At the same time, the Kuomintang Party issued instructions prohibiting the destruction of commercial houses belonging to Japanese or the infliction of physical harm. This does not mean that the lives of Japanese in China have never been threatened in the course of a boycott, but as a whole it may be stated that, during the more recent boycotts, acts of violence against Japanese subjects have been less numerous and serious than in earlier days.

An examination of the technique of the methods employed shows that the atmosphere of popular sentiment without which no boycott could succeed is created by a formidable propaganda uniformly carried out all over the country, using slogans well chosen to incite the popular mind against the "enemy" country.

In the present boycott directed against Japan, which the Commission has seen in operation, every available means was employed to impress upon the people the patriotic duty of not buying Japanese goods. The columns of the Chinese Press were filled with propaganda of this kind; the walls of buildings in the towns were covered with posters, often of an extremely violent character ; anti-Japanese slogans were printed on currency notes, on letters and telegram-forms; chain letters went from hand to hand, etc. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but serve to show the nature of the methods employed. -The fact that this propaganda does not differ essentially from that used in certain countries of Europe and America during the World War 1914–1918 only proves the degree of hostility towards Japan which the Chinese have come to feel as a result of the political tension between the two countries.

Essential as the political atmosphere of a boycott may be to its ultimate success, nevertheless no such movement could be effective if the boycott associations had not secured a certain uniformity in their rules of procedure. The four general principles adopted at the first meeting of the Shanghai Anti-Japanese Association held on July 17th, 1931, may serve as an illustration of the main objects aimed at by these rules. They were: