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 Countenance of another Man's Goods and Profits of the said Tenements and Chattels, till the said Creditors shall be bound to take a small parcel of their Debt, and release the Remnant." These nefarious transactions are now declared void in law. The modern swindler, who settles a comfortable income upon his wife, before his bubble bursts, is only a humble imitator of the mediaeval fraudulent bankrupt.

The practice of assigning uses was based on the difference between principal and interest—principal could be forfeited, or could lapse and revert, but mere interest could not. But in all these arrangements, the "beneficiary" (called in the Old Norman French, "cestuy que use") had to rely on the honour of the trustees. Common Law did not recognise these bargains. It said that the nominal tenant was entitled to the benefits, and if he refused to hand over the profits to cestuy que use, the latter had no remedy—he would be non-suited at Common Law. He would then appeal to the Chancery, "for the love of God and for charity," and the Lord Chancellor would decide that "in conscience" the nominal tenant ought to keep his promise, and would issue a writ to compel him to hand over the use and profits—for though the Common Law could not enforce its decisions the Chancery could. Hence Chancery and Equity Courts were known as "Courts of Conscience"; and Equity was defined as "that which mollifies or softens the rigour of the Common Law."

Between Edward III. and Henry VIII. many statutes were passed to make the beneficiary owner subject to certain liabilities in respect of his land, but means of evasion were always found. "Feoffment with livery of seizin was the regular mode of transfer by which one person could convey lands to another at common law, or the fictitious process of fine or recovery might be brought into use. There were other legal means of transferring lands, but in all cases the modes of conveying were open and notorious. But in conveying lands to uses there was no open act of transfer, and the Chancery laid it down that there was no reason why the intention of the donor should not be carried into effect at a future period. &hellip; A use might be raised on the happening of any future event, or on the expiration of any specified time. &hellip; Thus a power was acquired of