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70 279 Ark. at 346, 651 S.W.2d at 93. In other words, because the system failed for lack of a reasonable and legitimate governmental purpose to support it, it was not necessary to use a heightened standard of review like strict scrutiny to examine the system's constitutionality. Judge Imber used the same reasoning when she ruled that the current funding system was unconstitutional in her 1994 order. She found it unnecessary to decide whether an adequate education was a fundamental right for purposes of adequacy and inequity, since the school-funding system failed to pass constitutional muster even using a rational-basis standard.

[10] In his 2001 order, Judge Kilgore did not specifically state that an adequate education was a fundamental right under the Education Article. However, he did rule that he would apply a strict-scrutiny analysis to the state's legislation to decide whether there was constitutional compliance. Strict scrutiny usually goes hand-in-hand with a claim that a fundamental right has been impaired. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002) (the right to privacy for private sex between consenting adults was deemed a fundamental right where strict scrutiny would be the standard regarding any impairment). Judge Kilgore also announced at a pretrial hearing "that language in the Constitution is consistent with and supports the proposition that the State of Arkansas has a compelling interest in seeing that our children get adequate educations, or general, suitable and efficient education. That being the case, the standard that the State will be held to in showing that we do have an adequate system of education will be strict scrutiny."

With the exceptions of New Hampshire, ''see Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, supra, and Kentucky, see Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., supra'', most states in recent years have avoided proclaiming that an adequate education is a fundamental right because that carries with it the obligation of the courts to examine and scrutinize all legislation respecting education strictly. We must admit to some apprehension about using a strict-scrutiny standard, because it has never been this court's constitutional function to micromanage the public schools of this state or even to retain jurisdiction over the public school system until, in our judgment, an adequacy standard has been achieved.