Page:Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin.pdf/16

Rh The dissent’s own arguments undermine any suggestion that Congress adopted such a siloed view. For instance, the dissent repeatedly paints tribes as occupying a hybrid position between foreign and domestic,, (opinion of ), and posits that Territories historically share this hybrid status as well,  (describing Territories as tribes’ “close comparator”). Yet, as the dissent readily acknowledges, Congress expressly included Territories within §101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit.” If, on the dissent’s own account, Territories are “neither foreign nor domestic,” ibid.—and fall within §101(27)’s purview nevertheless—it is hard to see how §101(27)’s catchall phrase would simultaneously exclude other entities that share that same feature. §101(27) (“ ‘governmental unit’ means United States; State; … Territory; … foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government” (emphasis added)).

In any case, neither petitioners nor the dissent explain why the Code would draw such a line in the sand. None of the carefully calibrated exceptions noted in Part III–B, supra, for governmental units performing regulatory and tax-related functions turn on whether a government is purely foreign or domestic. Likewise, it is hard to see why the Code would subject purely foreign or domestic governments to enforcement proceedings while at the same time immunizing government creditors that have both foreign and domestic attributes. Considering that the one thing every entity in §101(27)’s enumerated list has in common is its governmental nature—and that is the same characteristic that matters when the Code addresses “governmental unit[s]”