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 answer whose falsity I need not stay to expose. It seems as if judgment must pass for Knowledge through non-appearance of a possible rival. But the case for it may be put more positively. Why do we act or will? Not in order to act or to live: such answers, however true, are at our present level of thought meaningless. Is it so great a paradox to reply: we act always in order to see what will come of it, to see what the result will be, to see how things and ourselves will comport themselves, how they will respond to our call upon them and show us what they and we are? At least the experimenting man of science will not lightly reject our account of his motives, and we shall have deprived the complacent practical man of his most useful ally. But even the practical man may be challenged to say whether he expects (excluding pleasure) any other fruit and reward of his action than knowledge of himself, others and the world. Does he desire aught else than to see the work of his hands, to behold his business flourish or his enemy prostrate in the dust? But is this 'seeing' knowledge? Most assuredly it is, and it is the end of the doing, the only element in the total result which is not the doing itself, the only thing there to which the doing can be called a means.

A full vindication of this view is not here attempted, Here what is suggested is the principle in the light of whose truth the whole controversy 'pales its ineffectual fires'. The principle is that our nature is the free alliance of two sovereign powers, and our life the history of their co-operation without derogation of their several autonomy. Each sovereign power has its ministers and subordinates: the Will realizes itself through volitions, passions, desires, appetites, &c., the Intellect realizes itself through the