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 only differents, but differences differ from one another. This he acknowledges, and indeed insists upon, and nowhere more than 'in his own house'. But he must equally, or more, insist upon the difference between real and unreal, genuine and spurious differences. The doctrine of degrees of reality here or elsewhere is not a popular one—precisely because it is a philosophical one. And indeed even within philosophy it is itself inadequate. At any rate here we are on the look out for differences in reality which are more than of degree, which sunder their differents by a gap which no interpolation of graded media can fill, which justify the contrast of the severed terms as respectively real and unreal, and finally expose the hollowness of a fancied unity of nature unevenly divided between the contrasted terms.

Philosophy can admit no differences which cannot approve themselves real and genuine, whereas in practical common sense, and even in the sciences, only spurious differences are admitted or both are confounded together. The fact of difference thus, with a proviso, to the full admitted, a few words may be said as to the nature and implications of this fact, care being taken to supply no more than can be easily assimilated even by common sense and science. Perhaps in the discussion of them some grounds will emerge, some reasons insinuate themselves, for the philosophic faith that only such differences are real and genuine which can vindicate for themselves an intelligible place within an ordered and harmonious unity, or at least that those which fail to do so lie under grave suspicion of unreality and imposture.

Paradoxical as it may sound, it is universally true that every difference implies and presupposes as its basis a unity within which lie the terms it holds apart. This holds even of what is called mere or bare difference,