Page:Kissinger's Trip (3) - November 25-29, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1553936).pdf/31

 the best vehicle for maintaining substantial forces in Europe by defusing Congressional pressures for reductions and said that any agreement on these negotiations would only amount to about a ten percent cut.

"On Japan, Teng said that Japan's relations with us were the first priority, and its relations with China came second. I said that your visit to Japan had put our relations on a steady course.

"Teng called the Middle East the most sensitive area and suggested that the Russians were making a comeback against our earlier inroads. He said it was important for us to help the Arabs as well as Israel.  China in turn must support the Arab/Palestinian cause, but at the same time wishes to see erosion of Soviet influence. I responded that we were continuing to make progress, though in less dramatic fashion, and that I expected further movement by February, which should once again give us momentum vis-a-vis Moscow. I explained that we have to follow a step-by-step approach in order to handle our domestic situation and promised him a further rundown on our assistance to various Arab countries in a more restricted session tomorrow. I emphasized three main principles: (1) The US will not yield to pressure in the Middle East, especially Soviet pressure; (2) No diplomatic progress is possible without us and therefore sooner or later everyone, including the Palestinians, would have to come to us; (3) We were determined to bring about diplomatic progress and we would succeed though there will be temporary ups and downs.

"The Vice Premier approved of our bettering relations with India, in order to counter Soviet influence. I explained that this was the purpose of my trip and that we plan to help Pakistan in the wake of Bhutto's visit early next year. We agreed on India's essentially expansionist impulses, though he stressed China's lack of concern about any direct Indian military threat.

"Teng repeated familiar Chinese position on Cambodia, suggesting once again that we leave the field.

"I emphasized that we had nothing particular to gain in Cambodia but that we could not simply abandon our friends. I stated that we had nothing against Sihanouk but thought he should lead a balance of forces and not be a figurehead completely dependent on forces controlled by