Page:Kissinger's Trip (2) - November 25-29, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1553935).pdf/9

Rh to you. It is not expedient to do -- well, the act of recognition in itself will change the nature of that arrangement because you cannot have a defense treaty with part of a country.


 * I have noticed the consideration which the Doctor has just mentioned. And I understand that all of these imaginations the Doctor has discussed with the Foreign Minister while he was in New York in October.


 * That is correct.


 * And I believe in principle the Foreign Minister gave you the answers on our side concerning the princial [sic] matters. In essence your imaginations -- your considerations -- cannot be considered as being in accord with the Japan model.

And we feel that in essence it is still a variation of one China and one Taiwan.


 * Why is that?


 * Well, this is primarily that you just reverse the position, change the position of the liaison office. The present situation is that we have established a liaison office in Peking -- we have established our liaison office in Washington and you have established one in Peking. And you keep an embassy in Taiwan. This in itself indicates there has not been the necessary conditions for the normalization of relations.

In other words, if you change this order, that is, to have an embassy in Peking and a liaison office in Taiwan, it is not the way to correct the problem.

People will come to the conclusion that it is actually a variation of one China and one Taiwan. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept this formula.

And just now you touched upon the question of the defense treaty. That is, the defense treaty which you have with Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. Of course, if we are to achieve the normalization of relations between our two countries and abide by the course set in the Shanghai Communique, then the treaty you have with Taiwan must be done away with.