Page:Kissinger's Trip (2) - November 25-29, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1553935).pdf/46




 * So we can see from that that the recent talk about the publicization of the telegram we sent to the Soviet Union on its National Day is not quite in accord with facts.


 * Did you publish it, or did they?


 * We did not. But they deleted a bit [from the Chinese text] when they did. Actually, we put congratulations in the cable, we put in just the content of the agreement reached between the two Premiers in 1969, we just mentioned the essence of the agreement between the two Premiers: that we should maintain the status quo on the border; prevent armed conflict and avoid clashes on the border; and it has what they put forward about an agreement on non-aggression and non-use-of-force.


 * This is new?


 * It is not new. It was also part of the understanding of 1969.


 * But if they should succeed -- it will be the first such non-aggression treaty among allies.


 * Their proposals were put forward under the circumstances that the treaty still exists, our treaty of mutual assistance still exists. So it seems that the Soviet policy of hostility against China has not changed. And, of course, this doesn't exclude more tricks, such as asking this person or that person to come and mediate, but it doesn't change the essence [of China's dispute with the Soviets]. The methods that they continue to use are military threat and subversion. And they will continue their tricks such as the Asian Collective Security system. That also was something mentioned [by Brezhnev] in Ulan Bator.


 * Apparently, he discussed that with Bhutto, but he rejected it. Brezhnev also discussed it with the Shah in Moscow.


 * It was the same old theme. Others expressed a certain degree of favor for it, but --


 * The Shah will not go along with it.