Page:Kissinger's Trip (2) - November 25-29, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1553935).pdf/21

 They adopted a seemingly indifferent attitude. I underlined the domestic policy problems and the effect on other countries of an abrupt abandonment of the defense of our friends on Taiwan. I said that if they could show understanding on this aspect, specifically the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, we would be prepared to move toward complete normalization. Otherwise we were content to continue drawing down our military presence and stringing out the diplomatic process. There are essentially three issues: Our residual presence in Taiwan once we establish diplomatic relations; the principle of one China with Taiwan being a part of it; and the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue in place of our defense commitment. Their opening stance did not indicate much give, but this is not surprising and it is too early to judge their real positions. I will attempt to probe the degree of their flexibility, and if reasonable progress does not look possible, there is no need to press the issue on this trip.

"At the end of the Taiwan discussion, Teng said that whatever happened with respect to Taiwan we should show further progress in US-Sino relations. Therefore, they wanted to invite Schlesinger to visit the PRC. This, I believe, would have very severe repercussions in the USSR. I shall turn it off today and try to turn it into an invitation to you. I shall also offer them any other Cabinet member. If they agree, there will be no way to keep it out of the final Communique.

"After the meeting, Ambassador Bush hosted a reception at his residence. We then went to a cultural variety show at the Great Hall of the People, consisting of singing, dancing and playing of traditional instruments. The technical skills were impressive, but the revolutionary themes and choreography were crude."