Page:Kissinger's Trip (1) - November 25-29, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1553934).pdf/22

 We think Japan would have to be very careful to come closer to the Soviet Union. It is a very dangerous course for Japan.

But no matter whoever comes to office, they still have a fundamental issue they cannot solve. This issue we discussed last night. The question of the Northern Territories [the four northern islands which Japan wants the Soviets to return].

We will know in ten days, which is more than you can say of most international events. Perhaps after the Prime Minister is selected, if there is an unexpected development, we can exchange ideas.

So how do you think we should carry on our talks?

I think perhaps we can make a few observations now of a general nature, and then we might work in smaller groups. One set of views should concern our usual review of the international situation, and then discussion of continuing the process of normalizing relations. The second set of views covers more technical issues, which we should have discussed among our experts.

On the bilateral issues, if I could perhaps say one word before the experts get carried away with their enthusiasm: Such issues as the bilateral exchanges and cultural agreements are essentially a symbolic aspect of our foreign policy, of our political relations, and therefore we will deal with them in this context. Frankly I am indifferent as to whether there is a million dollars more or less in settling the question of blocked accounts, or whether one group more or less goes back and forth between the United States and China. We should use these as a symbol of our overall relationship. So when you want to settle them. [the claims/assets problems] you let us know, and we will find a way of settling them.

We believe that, hopefully conditions are favorable to show some advance in our relationship. We think this is, would be, a fulfillment of the principles of the Shanghai Communique as well as some of the discussions we had when we made our first visits to China. We think it is desirable in terms of the overall international situation, so that there is no misunderstanding about the evolution of our relationship in the eyes of other countries.

So we are prepared. On the other hand, we won't press you, and you let us know at what speed you want to proceed on these technical bilateral