Page:Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. Mony Preap, et al..pdf/43

4 paragraph (1) “describ[e]” all ABCD aliens, even those whom the Secretary has “take[n] into custody” many years after their release from prison? Or does it “describ[e]” only those aliens whom the Secretary has “take[n] into custody… when the alien [was] released” from prison?

The issue may sound technical. But it is extremely important. That is because the Government’s reading of the statute–namely, that paragraph (2) forbids bail hearings for all ABCD aliens regardless of whether they were detained “when… released” from criminal custody–would significantly expand the Secretary’s authority to deny bail hearings. Under the Government’s view, the aliens subject to detention without a bail hearing may have been released from criminal custody years earlier, and may have established families and put down roots in a community. These aliens may then be detained for months, sometimes years, without the possibility of release; they may have been convicted of only minor crimes–for example, minor drug offenses, or crimes of “moral turpitude” such as illegally downloading music or possessing stolen bus transfers; and they sometimes may be innocent spouses or children of a suspect person. Moreover, for a high percentage of them, it will turn out after months of custody that they will not be removed from the country because they are eligible by statute to receive a form of relief from removal such as cancellation of removal. These are not mere hypotheticals. See Appendix B, infra. Thus, in terms of potential consequences and basic American legal traditions, see infra, at 11–12, the question before us is not a “narrow” one, ante, at 2 (, concurring).

Why would Congress have granted the Secretary such broad authority to deny bail hearings, especially when doing so would run contrary to basic American and