Page:Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. Mony Preap, et al..pdf/37

4 marks omitted). But the text of the statute contains no such exception. Accordingly, I continue to think that no court has jurisdiction over these kinds of actions.

Third, §1252(f)(1) deprives district courts of “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of [§§1221–1232] other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under [§§1221–1232] have been initiated.” The text of §1252(f)(1) explicitly prohibits the classwide injunctive relief ordered by the Northern District of California in this instance, given that the class includes future, yet-to-be detained aliens against whom proceedings have not been initiated. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 481 (1999) (explaining that §1252(f)(1) “prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation of §§1221–1231”). The District Court relied on Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F. 3d 1105 (CA9 2010), which held that this provision does not affect authority to enjoin alleged violations of the specified statutes because those claims do not “seek to enjoin the operation of the immigration detention statutes, but to enjoin conduct… not authorized by the statutes.” Id., at 1120. This reasoning is circular and unpersuasive. Many claims seeking to enjoin or restrain the operation of the relevant statutes will allege that the Executive’s action does not comply with the statutory grant of authority, but the text clearly bars jurisdiction to enter an injunction “[r]egardless of the nature of the action or claim.” Although the Court avoids deciding whether §1252(f)(1) prevented the District Court’s injunction here, ante, at 8, I would hold that it did.

Finally, I harbor two concerns about whether the class