Page:Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. Mony Preap, et al..pdf/36

Rh it took the alien into custody immediately upon release.

At least three statutory provisions limit judicial review here, and I am skeptical whether the District Courts had Article III jurisdiction to certify the classes.

First, §1252(b)(9) bars judicial review of “all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States,” except for review of “a final order” or other circumstances not present here. These cases raise questions of law or fact arising from removal proceedings–“[d]etention is necessarily a part of [the] deportation procedure” that culminates in the removal of the alien, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 538 (1952)–and they do not come to us on review of final orders of removal. Thus, for the reasons I set forth in Jennings, supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–11), no court has jurisdiction over these class actions.

Second, §1226(e) provides that “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the [Secretary] under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” (Emphasis added.) This provision “unequivocally deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to set aside ‘any action or decision’ by the [Secretary]” regarding detention, discretionary or otherwise. Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 533 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see Jennings, supra, at ___, n. 6 (slip op., at 11, n. 6). The Court once again reads this language as permitting judicial review for challenges to the “statutory framework as a whole.” Ante, at 7 (internal quotation