Page:Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. Mony Preap, et al..pdf/3

Rh “pursuant to” subsection (c)(1) or “under authority created by” subsection (c)(1), but to anyone so much as “described in” subsection (c)(1). Pp. 15–17.
 * (c) This reading of §1226(c) does not flout the interpretative canon against surplusage. The “when… released” clause still functions to clarify when the duty to arrest is triggered and to exhort the Secretary to act quickly. Nor does this reading have the incongruous result of forbidding the release of a set of aliens whom there is no duty to arrest in the first place. Finally, the canon of constitutional avoidance does not apply where there is no ambiguity. See Warger v. Shauers, 574 U. S. 40, 50. Pp. 20–26.

, joined by and, concluded in Parts II and III–B–2:
 * (a) This Court has jurisdiction to hear these cases. The limitation on review in §1226(e) applies only to “discretionary” decisions about the “application” of §1226 to particular cases. It does not block lawsuits over “the extent of the Government’s detention authority under the ‘statutory framework’ as a whole.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___. For reasons stated in Jennings, “§1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.” See id., at ___. Whether the District Court in the Preap case had jurisdiction under §1252(f)(1) to grant injunctive relief is irrelevant because the court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief. And, the fact that by the time of class certification the named plaintiffs had obtained either cancellation of removal or bond hearings did not make these cases moot. At least one named plaintiff in both cases could have been returned to detention and then denied a subsequent bond hearing. Even if that had not been so, these cases would not be moot because the harms alleged are transitory enough to elude review. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 52. Pp. 7–10.
 * (b) Even assuming that §1226(c)(1) requires immediate arrest, the result below would be wrong, because a statutory rule that officials “ ‘shall’ act within a specified time” does not by itself “preclud[e] action later,” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 158. This principle for interpreting time limits on statutory mandates was a fixture of the legal backdrop when Congress enacted §1226(c). Cf. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 209. Pp. 17–20.

, joined by, concluded that three statutory provisions–8 U. S. C. §§1252(b)(9), 1226(e), and 1252(f)(1)–limit judicial review in these cases and it is unlikely that the District Courts had Article III jurisdiction to certify the classes. Pp. 1–6.

, announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the