Page:Kerry v. Din.pdf/5

Rh 2000, and became a naturalized citizen in 2007. She filed a petition to have Kanishka Berashk, whom she married in 2006, classified as her immediate relative. The petition was granted, and Berashk filed a visa application. The U. S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, interviewed Berashk and denied his application. A consular officer informed Berashk that he was inadmissible under §1182(a)(3)(B) but provided no further explanation.

Din then brought suit in Federal District Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the United States to properly adjudicate Berashk’s visa application; a declaratory judgment that 8 U. S. C. §1182(b)(2)–(3), which exempts the Government from providing notice to an alien found inadmissible under the terrorism bar, is unconstitutional as applied; and a declaratory judgment that the denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act. App. 36–39, Complaint ¶¶55–68. The District Court granted the Gov­ ernment’s motion to dismiss, but the Ninth Circuit re­versed. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Din "has a protected liberty interest in marriage that entitled [her] to review of the denial of [her] spouse’s visa," 718 F. 3d 856, 860 (2013), and that the Government’s citation of §1182(a)(3)(B) did not provide Din with the "limited judi­cial review" to which she was entitled under the Due Process Clause, id., at 868. This Court granted certiorari. 573 U. S. ___ (2014).

The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Although the amount and quality of process that our precedents have recognized as "due" under the Clause has changed considerably since the founding, ''see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip'', 499 U. S. 1, 28–36 (1991) (, J., concurring in judgment), it remains the case that no process is due if one is not de­prived of "life, liberty, or property," Swarthout v. Cooke,