Page:Kerry v. Din.pdf/30

Rh , dissenting the constitutional insistence upon a particular procedure by balancing, with respect to that procedure, the "private interest" at stake, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation" absent the sought-after protection, and the Government’s interest in not providing additional procedure. Eldridge, supra, at 335; but cf. Hamdi, supra, at 533 (plurality opinion) (suggesting minimal due process requirements cannot be balanced away). Here "balancing" would not change the result. The "private interest" is important, the risk of an "erroneous deprivation" is significant, and the Government’s interest in not providing a reason is normally small, at least administratively speaking. Indeed, Congress requires the State Department to provide a reason for a visa denial in most contexts. 8 U. S. C. §1182(b)(1). Accordingly, in the absence of some highly unusual circumstance (not shown to be present here, see infra, at 9), the Constitution requires the Government to provide an adequate reason why it refused to grant Ms. Din’s husband a visa. That reason, in my view, could be either the factual basis for the Government’s decision or a sufficiently specific statutory subsection that conveys effectively the same information.

, without denying that Ms. Din was entitled to a reason, believes that she received an adequate reason here. According to the complaint, however, the State Department’s denial letter stated only that the visa "had been denied under . . . 8 U. S. C. §1182(a)." App. 30. In response to requests for further explanation, the State Department sent an e-mail stating that the visa "had been denied under . . . 8 U. S. C. §1182 (a)(3)(B)—the terrorism and national security bars to admissibility." Id., at 31. I do not see how either statement could count as adequate.