Page:Kerry v. Din.pdf/21

4 Like the professors who sought an audience with Dr. Mandel, Din claims her constitutional rights were burdened by the denial of a visa to a noncitizen, namely her husband. And as in Mandel, the Government provided a reason for the visa denial: It concluded Din’s husband was inadmissible under §1182(a)(3)(B)’s terrorism bar. Even assuming Din’s rights were burdened directly by the visa denial, the remaining question is whether the reasons given by the Government satisfy Mandel&apos;s "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard. I conclude that they do.

Here, the consular officer’s determination that Din’s husband was ineligible for a visa was controlled by specific statutory factors. The provisions of §1182(a)(3)(B) establish specific criteria for determining terrorism-related inadmissibility. The consular officer’s citation of that provision suffices to show that the denial rested on a determination that Din’s husband did not satisfy the statute’s requirements. Given Congress’ plenary power to "suppl[y] the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United States," ''United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 543 (1950), it follows that the Government’s decision to exclude an alien it determines does not satisfy one or more of those conditions is facially legitimate under Mandel''.

The Government’s citation of §1182(a)(3)(B) also indicates it relied upon a bona fide factual basis for denying a visa to Berashk. Cf. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14–15 (1926). Din claims due process requires she be provided with the facts underlying this determination, arguing Mandel required a similar factual basis. It is true the Attorney General there disclosed the facts motivating his decision to deny Dr. Mandel a waiver, and that the Court cited those facts as demonstrating “the Attorney General validly exercised the plenary power that Congress delegated to the Executive."