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Rh power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.'" Id., at 766, 768 (citation omitted). To do so would require "courts in each case. . . to weigh the strength of the audience’s interest against that of the Government in refusing a [visa] to the particular applicant," a nuanced and difficult decision Congress had "properly. . . placed in the hands of the Executive." Id.,at 769.

Instead, the Court limited its inquiry to the question whether the Government had provided a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for its action. Id., at 770. Finding the Government had proffered such a reason—Mandel’s abuse of past visas—the Court ended its inquiry and found the Attorney General’s action to be lawful. See ibid. The Court emphasized it did not address "[w]hat First Amendment or other grounds may be available for attacking an exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is advanced." Ibid.

The reasoning and the holding in Mandel control here. That decision was based upon due consideration of the congressional power to make rules for the exclusion of aliens, and the ensuing power to delegate authority to the Attorney General to exercise substantial discretion in that field. Mandel held that an executive officer’s decision denying a visa that burdens a citizen’s own constitutional rights is valid when it is made "on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason." Id., at 770. Once this standard is met, "courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against” the constitutional interests of citizens the visa denial might implicate. Ibid.

This reasoning has particular force in the area of national security, for which Congress has provided specific statutory directions pertaining to visa applications by noncitizens who seek entry to this country.