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fundamental right. Even where Congress has provided special privileges to promote family immigration, it has also "written in careful checks and qualifications." Ibid. This Court has consistently recognized that these various distinctions are “policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 798 (1977). Only by diluting the meaning of a fundamental liberty interest and jettisoning our established jurispru­dence could we conclude that the denial of Berashk’s visa application implicates any of Din’s fundamental liberty interests.

suggests that procedural due process rights attach to liberty interests that either are (1) created by nonconstitutional law, such as a statute, or (2) "suffi­ciently important” so as to "flow 'implicit[ly]' from the design, object, and nature of the Due Process Clause." Post, at 2.

The first point is unobjectionable, at least given this Court’s case law. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262, and n. 8 (1970); Collins 503 U. S., at 129. But it is unhelpful to Din, who does not argue that a statute confers on her a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. attempts to make this argument for Din, latching onto language in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U. S. 209, 221 (2005), saying that a liberty interest "may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies." Such an "expectation" has been created here, he asserts, because "the law . . . surrounds marriage with a host of legal protections to the point that it creates a strong expectation that government will not deprive married individuals of their freedom to live to­gether without strong reasons and (in individual cases)