Page:Keil and Delitzsch,Biblical commentary the old testament the pentateuch, trad James Martin, volume 1, 1885.djvu/649

 unto her, she shall go out for nothing, without money.” “These three” are food, clothing, and conjugal rights, which are mentioned just before; not “si eam non desponderit sibi nec filio, nec redimi sit passus” (Rabbins and others), nor “if he did not give her to his son as a concubine, but diminished her,” as Knobel explains it. Still higher than personal liberty, however, is life itself, the right of existence and personality; and the infliction of injury upon this was not only prohibited, but to be followed by punishment corresponding to the crime. The principle of retribution, jus talionis, which is the only one that embodies the idea of justice, lies at the foundation of these threats.

verses 12-13
A death-blow was to be punished with death (cf. Gen 9:6; Lev 24:17). “He that smiteth a man and (so that) he die (whether on the spot or directly afterwards did not matter), he shall be put to death.” This general rule is still further defined by a distinction being drawn between accidental and intentional killing. “But whoever has not lain in wait (for another's life), and God has caused it to come to his hand” (to kill the other); i.e., not only if he did not intend to kill him, but did not even cherish the intention of smiting him, or of doing him harm from hatred and enmity (Num 35:16-23; Deu 19:4-5), and therefore did so quite unawares, according to a dispensation of God, which is generally called an accident because it is above our comprehension. For such a man God would appoint places of refuge, where he should be protected against the avenger of blood. (On this point, see Num 35:9.).

verses 14-17
“But he who acts presumptuously against his neighbour, to slay him with guile, thou shalt take him from Mine altar that he may die.” These words are not to be understood as meaning, that only intentional and treacherous killing was to be punished with death; but, without restricting the general rule in Exo 21:12, they are to be interpreted from their antithesis to Exo 21:13, as signifying that even the altar of Jehovah was not to protect a man who had committed intentional murder, and carried out his purpose with treachery. (More on this point at Num 35:16.) By this regulation, the idea, which was common to the Hebrews and many other nations, that the altar as God's abode afforded protection to any life that was in danger from men, was brought back to the