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 ** reviews of air carriers' audit procedures, assessment processes, and documentation supporting review conclusions to ensure the consistency, quality, and effectiveness of the review results;
 * comprehensive audits of a sample of safety assessments to confirm that carriers have applied agreed upon standards and procedures in conducting the assessments; and
 * procedures to, if necessary, perform on-site inspection of aircraft used in code share operations.


 * Require that FAA staff perform risk assessments using available safety data on foreign carriers and review results of air carrier safety assessments, if made available, as part of its safety advice to OST on code share applications. This interim procedure should be used no more than 3 months, until the Department finalizes new code share procedures.

1.18.1.1 Postaccident Actions Taken by the Federal Aviation Administration

On August 15, 1997, the FAA announced in a press release that, as a "routine precaution," it had ordered MSAW testing and recertification after the Safety Board's investigation of the flight 801 accident raised questions about the MSAW's performance. The FAA reported that, of the 192 in-service MSAW software functions at radar approach control facilities, all but 2 were found to be working properly. According to the press release, the software functions were corrected, and all of the functions were recertified as operating properly. Also, in response to inquiries from Safety Board staff, the FAA created special teams of automation experts to completely examine all site adaptation parameters for the 192 MSAW systems located throughout the United States. The FAA directed ATC managers at these locations to document and report any MSAW problems. Further, the FAA's Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services directed a factfinding review of MSAW equipment and operational procedures at 10 ATC towers The review included a survey of 105 air traffic personnel and 33 airway facilities personnel.