Page:KAL801Finalreport.pdf/48

 Charts 11-1 and 13-2 were found side by side and were visible through one face of the plastic sleeve. Chart 16-1 and the blank side of an approach plate were visible through the opposite face of the plastic sleeve. Chart 11-1, which is shown in figure 7, had the following items highlighted with a green fluorescent tint:


 * Plan view
 * ILS facilities box: 063° (inbound magnetic course), 110.3 (ILS frequency), IGUM (identifier), and FLAKE (IAF).
 * VOR facilities box: 115.3 (NIMITZ VOR frequency) and UNZ (identifier).


 * Profile view
 * 2500' (msl altitude crossing FLAKE).
 * 1900' (msl altitude crossing the outer marker).
 * 256' (touchdown zone elevation-runway 6L).

The instrument approach charts for Guam International Airport in effect at the time of the accident were issued on August 2, 1996 (with an effective date of August 15, 1996). Changes incorporated in the August 2, 1996, 11-1, ILS runway 6L approach chart (shown in figure 1) included the location names, crossing altitudes, and the missed approach procedure. Table 2 details the specific differences between the January and August 1996 instrument approach charts.

The accident airplane was equipped with a Sundstrand Data Corporation model 573A FDR, serial number 2663, which was configured to record 51 parameters. The FDR recorded information digitally on four tracks using ?-inch-wide magnetic tape that had a recording duration of 25 hours before the oldest data were overwritten. Even though the FDR case was damaged by impact forces, data could be retrieved and analyzed. Examination of the data indicated that the FDR had operated normally, except for a loss of synchronization about 3 seconds before the transition to 25-hour-old data. About 3 hours 48 minutes of data were transcribed for the entire accident flight (takeoff to impact).

After an initial readout of the FDR, Korean Air provided the Safety Board with documentation that indicated that 11 additional sensors had been retrofitted after the airline took delivery of the airplane. These retrofitted sensors--exhaust gas temperature and oil quantities for the airplane's four engines, static air pressure, and the left No. 4 and right No. 12 spoiler positions--were not reflected in the FDR documentation provided by the manufacturer or the airline at the time of the initial FDR readout. Documentation for the additional sensors provided by Korean Air did not include the equations necessary to