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 Valuable user group reviews of proposed new instrument procedures are hampered by the format in which the information is disseminated; thus, user groups may not be able to effectively evaluate whether a procedure is safe, accurate, and intelligible. At the time of the flight 801 accident, there were underlying systemic problems within Korean Air's operations and pilot training programs that indicated the need for a broad safety assessment of these programs.|The Korean Civil Aviation Bureau was ineffective in its oversight of Korean Air's operations and pilot training program. The Federal Aviation Administration's International Aviation Safety Assessment program (which evaluates a foreign civil aviation authority's ability to provide adequate oversight for its air carriers) is not adequate to determine whether foreign air carriers operating into the United States are maintaining an adequate level of safety.|An independent accident investigation authority, charged with making objective conclusions and recommendations, is a benefit to transportation safety.It is critical that thorough documentation of the information recorded by a flight data recorder be available for foreign- or U.S.-registered air transport airplanes that fly into or out of the United States.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach and the first officer's and flight engineer's failure to effectively monitor and cross-check the captain's execution of the approach. Contributing to these failures were the captain's fatigue and Korean Air's inadequate flight crew training.

Contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's intentional inhibition of the minimum safe altitude warning system at Guam and the agency's failure to adequately manage the system.