Page:KAL801Finalreport.pdf/187

 The captain may have mistakenly believed that the airplane was closer to the airport than its actual position; however, if the captain conducted the flight's descent on this basis, he did so in disregard of the DME fix definitions shown on the approach chart. As a result of his confusion and preoccupation with the status of the glideslope, failure to properly cross-check the airplane's position and altitude with the information on the approach chart, and continuing expectation of a visual approach, the captain lost awareness of flight 801's position on the instrument landing system localizer-only approach to runway 6L at Guam International Airport and improperly descended below the intermediate approach altitudes of 2,000 and 1,440 feet, which was causal to the accident. The first officer and flight engineer noted the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) callouts and the first officer properly called for a missed approach, but the captain's failure to react properly to the GPWS minimums callout and the direct challenge from the first officer precluded action that might have prevented the accident. The first officer and flight engineer failed to properly monitor and/or challenge the captain's performance, which was causal to the accident. Monitored approaches decrease the workload of the flying pilot and increase flight crew interaction, especially when experienced captains monitor and prompt first officers during the execution of approaches. The captain was fatigued, which degraded his performance and contributed to his failure to properly execute the approach. Korean Air's training in the execution of nonprecision approaches was ineffective, which contributed to the deficient performance of the flight crew. U.S. air carrier pilots would benefit from additional training and practice in nonprecision approaches during line operations (in daytime visual conditions in which such a practice would not add a risk factor). <li>The Combined Center/Radar Approach Control controller's performance was substandard in that he failed to provide the flight crew with a position advisory when he cleared the flight for the approach, inform the flight crew or the Agana tower controller that he had observed a rain shower on the final approach path, and monitor the flight after the frequency change to the tower controller.</li> <li>Strict adherence to air traffic control procedures by the Combined Center/Radar Approach Control controller may have prevented the accident or reduced its severity.</li> </ol>