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 alarms are received in the ATCT upon transfer of communications." The FAA indicated that the effective date for this notice would be February 1, 2000.

The Safety Board is concerned about the delay in the implementation of Safety Recommendation A-95-120. In addition, the Safety Board is especially concerned that the FAA, until it received queries from the Board, was apparently not aware of, or not addressing, procedural barriers that prevented the installed equipment from being used as intended. However, on the basis of the FAA's apparent continued intention to fully implement this recommendation, it remains classified "Open--Acceptable Response."

Although a fire station was located about 1 mile from the accident site, the first emergency response equipment (dispatched from a different fire station about 3 ½ miles from the accident site) did not arrive on scene until approximately 52 minutes after the accident. Safety Board investigators attempted to determine the reason(s) for the slow emergency response and the extent to which it could have been reduced or avoided.

Because of the air traffic controllers' delayed discovery of the accident, ramp control personnel, who were responsible for emergency notifications, were not aware of the accident until 0158, about 16 minutes after the crash occurred. As discussed in section 2.6.1, if the CERAP controller had been monitoring the flight more closely, this delay might have been eliminated or reduced.

After being notified of the accident by Guam airport ramp control, the Guam Fire Department (GFD) communications center dispatched GFD Engine No. 7, which was stationed about 3 ? miles from the crash site, at 0207. However, Engine No. 7's departure from the station was delayed by 12 minutes because its brake system needed to be recharged with air. Engine No. 7 departed the station at 0219, and its en route response time was 15 minutes. Engine No. 7 was the first emergency response vehicle to arrive at the VOR access road (at 0234, 52 minutes after the accident). The nearest fire station to the accident site was the U.S. Navy Federal Fire Department (located about 1 mile from the accident site). According to Federal dispatch facility logs, that station was not notified of the accident until 0234. The station's Engine No. 5 was then immediately dispatched and arrived at the accident scene at 0239 (a response time of 5 minutes). The Chief of Staff for the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas, notified Navy "first responders" to stand by after she learned of the accident at 0216. However, the Navy had not yet received a request for specific Federal firefighting and medical resources; therefore, it would have been inappropriate for the Chief of Staff to have dispatched these resources.