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 concludes that, by not fully briefing the instrument approach, the captain missed an opportunity to prepare himself, the first officer, and the flight engineer for the relatively complex localizer-only approach and failed to provide the first officer and flight engineer with adequate guidance about monitoring the approach; therefore, the captain's approach briefing was inadequate.

2.4.1.2 Expectation of a Visual Approach and Role of the Guam Airport Familiarization Video

The Safety Board notes that, when the captain flew to Guam about 1 month before the accident, he executed a routine ILS approach to runway 6L in good visibility, with a scattered cumulous buildup. Further, the most current ATIS information available to the accident flight crew indicated that visual conditions (scattered cloud decks and 7-mile visibility) existed at the airport. Korean Air's Guam airport familiarization video, which the captain and first officer had viewed in July 1997, noted that weather conditions in Guam allowed visual approaches most of the year and that, even though IMC is likely during the rainy season from June to November, "you [the pilot] will be guided from over Apra Harbor to the localizer. You will then perform a visual approach...." Thus, the captain may have assumed that conditions for the flight 801 approach would be similar to those he experienced about 1 month earlier. The captain's anticipation of a visual approach probably became a strong expectation after the flight crew's early visual sighting of Guam. Although the captain would likely have recognized the possibility of flight through clouds as the airplane descended from its cruise altitude, he may have assumed that the visual approach slope indicator (VASI) system would be in sight after the flight was vectored onto final approach by the CERAP controller. The VASI system would have provided visual guidance for a constant angle of descent that safely cleared obstacles.

As previously discussed, the captain's landing briefing included references to his expectation of visual conditions at the airport as well as an abbreviated and inadequate briefing for the localizer-only approach. The Safety Board concludes that the captain's expectation of a visual approach was a factor in his incomplete briefing of the localizer approach. The Board is aware that it is a common practice among air carrier pilots to abbreviate the briefing for a backup instrument approach when a visual approach is expected. Although there may be little benefit to fully briefing a backup instrument approach in daylight conditions when no appreciable possibility of encountering IMC exists, the Safety Board concludes that, for flights conducted at night or when there is any possibility that IMC may be encountered, the failure to fully brief an available backup instrument approach compromises safety. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require principal operations inspectors (POI) assigned to U.S. air carriers to ensure that air carrier pilots conduct a full briefing for the instrument approach (if available) intended to back up a visual approach conducted at night or when IMC may be encountered.