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 procedure, details of the approach's execution (including the minimum safe altitude, approach frequency and approach course, the runway touchdown zone elevation, and the missed approach procedure), crew actions and callouts, and any abnormal configurations or conditions.

CVR information indicated that the captain briefed a visual approach in his approach briefing, which he referred to as a "short briefing." However, the captain also briefed some elements of the localizer-only instrument approach, indicating that he intended to follow that approach as a supplement or backup to the visual approach. Specifically, the captain's briefing included a reminder that the glideslope was inoperative, some details of the radio setup, the localizer-only MDA, the missed approach procedure, and the visibility at Guam (stated by the captain to be 6 miles). However, the captain did not brief other information about the localizer-only approach, including the definitions of the FAF and step-down fixes and their associated crossing altitude restrictions or the title, issue, and effective dates of the approach charts to be used. The Safety Board notes that the landing briefing checklist did not specifically require the captain to brief the fix definitions, crossing altitudes, or approach chart title and dates, although it would have been good practice to do so.

Further, according to public hearing testimony by a Korean Air instructor pilot, company pilots were trained to conduct a more detailed briefing than the one specified in the landing briefing checklist for a nonprecision approach, such as the localizer approach to runway 6L at Guam. According to the instructor pilot, this more detailed briefing included a discussion of the "instrument approach in detail" and a discussion of the "stepdown altitudes and how they were determined." The Safety Board notes that this information is essential for a nonprecision approach briefing.

The Safety Board also notes that the captain did not brief the first officer and flight engineer on how he would fly the descent (including his planned autopilot/FD modes and his plan to fly either a constant angle of descent or a series of descents and level-off altitudes associated with the step-down fixes), and he did not discuss go-around decision criteria. Further, although not specifically required, it would have been prudent for the captain to note the need for special caution in the UNZ VOR area (which he had described as a "black hole" in his approach briefing to another first officer about 1 month earlier).

The Safety Board further notes that, in this case, a thorough briefing was especially important because the accident captain and first officer were flying together for the first time, which is a situation that has been linked to flight crew-involved accidents. The Safety Board According to recent human factors research, a good briefing is important to develop a "shared mental model" to ensure "that all crew members are solving the same problem and have the same understanding of priorities, urgency, cue significance, what to watch out for, who does what, and when to perform certain activities." The Safety Board