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 A factor contributing to the accident was fatigue induced by the flight crew's failure to properly manage provided rest periods.

American International Airways Flight 808

On August 18, 1993, American International Airways (d.b.a. Connie Kalitta Services, Inc.) flight 808, a Douglas DC-8-61, N814CK, was on a nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 121 operation when it crashed in at the U.S. Naval Air Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The cargo airplane collided with level terrain approximately ¼ mile from the approach end of runway 10 at Leeward Point Airfield after the captain lost control of the airplane. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire, and the three flight crew members--the only occupants aboard the airplane--received serious injuries. The cargo airplane was on the last leg of a flight sequence that day from Atlanta, Georgia, to Norfolk, Virginia, and then Guantanamo Bay.

The flight crew had been on duty about 18 hours and had flown approximately 9 hours. The captain did not recognize deteriorating flightpath and airspeed conditions because of his preoccupation with locating a strobe light on the ground. The flight engineer made repeated callouts regarding slow airspeed conditions. The captain initiated a turn on final approach at an airspeed below the calculated approach speed of 147 knots and less than 1,000 feet from the shoreline, and the captain allowed bank angles in excess of 50? to develop. The stall warning stickshaker activated 7 seconds before impact and 5 seconds before the airplane reached stall speed. No evidence indicated that the captain attempted to take proper corrective action at the onset of the stickshaker. The Safety Board concluded that the substandard performance by this experienced pilot may have reflected the debilitating influences of fatigue. In its report on this accident, the Safety Board stated that three background factors are commonly examined for evidence related to fatigue: cumulative sleep loss, continuous hours of wakefulness, and time of day. The flight crew had received limited sleep in the 48 hours before the accident because of flight and duty time. Also, at the time of the accident, the captain had been awake for 23.5 hours, the first officer for 19 hours, and the flight engineer for 21 hours. In addition, the accident occurred about 1656 eastern daylight time (based on a 24-hour clock), at the end of one of the two low periods in a person's circadian rhythm. The Board also considered the captain's self-report (for example, his report of