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The Safety Board has investigated several accidents in which fatigue was either the cause or a contributing factor. A discussion of two such accidents follows.

Continental Express Jet Link Flight 2733

On April 29, 1993, Continental Airlines (d.b.a. Continental Express) Jet Link flight 2733, an Embraer EMB-120RT, N24706, crashed at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, during a forced landing and runway overrun at a closed airport. The flight was a scheduled 14 CFR 135 operation from Little Rock, Arkansas, to Houston, Texas. The 2 flight crewmembers and 15 passengers were uninjured, and the flight attendant and 12 passengers received minor injuries. The accident occurred on the third day of a 3-day trip sequence, and the accident flight was the seventh and last flight of the day.

As the airplane was climbing, the captain, who was the PF, increased pitch so that the flight attendant could begin cabin service. The autoflight was set in pitch and heading modes, contrary to company policy. The airplane stalled in IMC at 17,400 feet. Initial recovery was at 6,700 feet. Because of an improper recovery procedure, a second stall occurred, and recovery was at 5,500 feet. The left propeller shed three blades, the left engine cowling separated, and the left engine was shut down in descent. Level flight could not be maintained, and a forced landing was made. The captain overshot the final turn because of controllability problems, and the airplane landed fast with 1,880 feet of wet runway remaining. The airplane hydroplaned off the runway and received additional damage. No preaccident malfunction was found.

The Safety Board's review of the captain's schedule revealed that the first day of the trip involved 9.5 hours of duty time followed by 8.5 hours of rest time (a reduced rest period). The second day of the trip involved 3.8 hours of duty time. The captain was off duty at 1130 but did not go to sleep until between midnight and 0030. On the third day of the trip, the captain awoke about 0500 for an early duty time. At the time of the accident, the captain had been awake for about 11 hours.

The first officer's flight, duty, and crew rest schedules were the same as that of the captain for the 3-day trip sequence. The first officer went to bed between 2300 and midnight on the night before the accident and awoke about 0430 on the day of the accident. The first officer had also been awake about 11 hours at the time of the accident.

The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was the captain's failure to maintain professional cockpit discipline, his consequent inattention to flight instruments and ice accretion, and his selection of an improper autoflight vertical mode, all of which led to an aerodynamic stall, loss of control, and a forced landing.