Page:Jung - The psychology of dementia praecox.djvu/173

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In conclusion I take the privilege of calling attention to two special points. Let us first consider the expressions of speech. As is the case with normal speech, our patient's speech, too, shows a tendency to change. The new creations of language are in the main technical terms serving to designate in concise form certain complicated domains of ideation. In normal speech the formation of and habituation to new terms is usually a very slow process and their application is generally dependent on certain limits of intelligence and logic. The new speech formation and habituation process in the patient merged into a pathological acceleration and intensity reaching far beyond the understanding of her environment. The process of building up pathological terms shows a resemblance to the principles of change in normal language. Recall, for example, the changes of interpretation of the "Languedoc" dialect. Many similar examples may be found in the history of language. Unfortunately I am not at home in this domain and do not dare search for further analogies. I feel, however, that a philologist would be able to make many important observations among patients with confused speech which would be of use in the study of the changes that have taken place in normal language in historical times.

Hallucinations of hearing play a particular part in the case of our patient. She elaborates her wishes of the day in the waking state, and at night in her dreams. It seems that she finds pleasure in this occupation, for it follows the direction corresponding to the inner inclinations of her personality. He whose thoughts run exclusively and perseveringly in a very definite and limited direction is forced to repress contrasting ideas. We know that in normal persons, or at least in tolerably normal individuals, such as moody men, though the same mood may continue for a long time, it is apt to be interrupted suddenly by an invasion with almost elemental force from another sphere of thought. We see this in its highest development in hysterics with dissociation of consciousness, where one state is not seldom suddenly replaced by the contrasting one. The contrasting state often manifests itself through hallucinations or other automatisms