Page:Journal of Speculative Philosophy Volumes 1 and 2.djvu/16

8 1. The categories (e. g. Unity, Reality, Causality, Existence, etc.) being merely subjective, or given by the constitution of the mind itself— for such universals are presupposed by all experience, and hence not derived from it— it follows :

2. If we abstract what we know to be subjective, we abstract all possibility of a thing in itself, too. For " existence" is a category, and hence if subjective, we may reasonably conclude that nothing objective can have existence.

3. Hence, since one category has no preference over another, and we can not give one of them objectivity without granting it to all others, it follows that there can be no talk of noumena, or of things in themselves, existing beyond the reach of the mind, for such talk merely applies what it pronounces to be subjective categories, (existence) while at the same time it denies the validity of their application.

III. But since we remove the supposed "noumena," the so-called phenomena are not opposed any longer to a correlate beyond the intelligence, and the noumenon proves to be mind itself.

An obvious corollary from this is, that by the self-determination of mind in pure thinking we shall find the fundamental laws of all phenomena.

Though the Kantian doctrine soon gave place in Germany to deeper insights, it found its way slowly to other countries. Comte and Sir Wm. Hamilton have made the negative results very widely known — the former, in natural science ; the latter, in literature and philosophy. Most of the writers named at the beginning are more or less imbued with Comte's doctrines, while a few follow Hamilton. For rhetorical purposes, the Hamiltonian statement is far superior to all others; for practical purposes, the Comtian. The physicist, wishing to give his undivided attention to empirical observation, desires an excuse for neglecting pure thinking ; he therefore refers to the well-known result of philosophy, that we cannot know anything of ultimate causes — we are limited to phenomena and laws. Although it must be conceded that this consolation is somewhat similar to that of the ostrich, who cunningly conceals his head in the sand when annoyed by the hunters, yet great benefit has thereby accrued to science through the undivided zeal of the investigators thus consoled.

When, however, a sufficiently large collection has been made, and the laws are sought for in the chaotic mass of observations, then thought must be had. Thought is the only crucible capable of dissolving "the many into the one." Tycho Brahe served a good purpose in collecting observations, but a Kepler was required to discern the celestial harmony involved therein.

This discovery of laws and relations, or of relative unities, proceeds to the final stage of science, which is that of the absolute comprehension.

Thus modern science, commencing with the close of the metaphysical epoch, has three stages or phases :

I. The first rests on mere isolated facts of experience; accepts the first phase of things, or that which comes directly before it, and hence may be termed the stage of immediateness. II. The second relates its thoughts to one another and compares them; it developes inequalities; tests one through another, and discovers dependencies everywhere ; since it learns that the first phase of objects is phenomenal, and depends upon somewhat lying beyond it ; since it denies truth to the immediate, it may be termed the stage of mediation.

III. A final stage, which considers a phenomenon in its totality, and thus seizes it in its noumenon, and is the stage of the comprehension. To resume : the first is that of sensuous knowing; the second, that of reflection (the understanding) ; the third, that of the reason (or the speculative stage).

In the sensuous knowing, we have crude, undigested masses all co-ordinated; each is in and for itself, and perfectly valid without the others. But as soon as reflection enters, dissolution is at work. Each is thought in sharp contrast with the rest; contradictions arise on every hand. The third stage finds its way out of these quarrelsome abstractions, and arrives at a synthetic unity, at a system, wherein the antagonisms are seen to form an organism.