Page:Journal of Speculative Philosophy Volume 17.djvu/76

67 possible to so know them. And this question is implicitly answered in the affirmative in this very objection; for, if our present knowledge is incorrect, this can be shown only by reference to an established objective order to which, by greater knowledge, it shall be shown that our present theories do not correspond.

Or, again, it may be said our account is incorrect, because the real reason for calling a feeling relative is not because we have any knowledge of the object as referred to which it is relative, but simply because under the same objective conditions different persons have different sensations, or even the same person at different times. But nothing is gained by this change in expression, since it assumes that there are permanent objective conditions, which must be known. For the two differing feelings are either known to refer to the same object or they are not. If not, all ground for calling them relative disappears. But, if they are, of course this object must be known. By any method of stating the theory, it will be found impossible to avoid reference to a known order objectively existing. In this connection it may not be without interest to quote Mr. Spencer's summary of the theory as admitting implicitly, though unconsciously, just this point. He says: "The quality and the quantity of the sensation produced by a given amount of a given external force vary not only with the structure of the organism, specific and individual, as well as the structure of the part affected, but also with the age, the constitutional state of the part as modified by temperature, circulation, and previous use, and even with the relative motion of subject and object." What we desire to call attention to are the two admissions or claims which he makes, all unconscious of their bearing upon his theory. (1) That there is objectively "a given amount of a given force;" and (2) that some nine objectively existing causes of the modification of this force as given in feeling can he shown. In short, it is assumed that there is an objective force, the kind and amount of which is known, and that the causes which produce the variations of this in immediate feeling can be shown, and, consequently, eliminated.

So far, our conclusions as to the relation of the theory of Relativity of Feeling to the theory of knowledge have been negative, and consisted in pointing out that it was not consistent with Sensationalism. But we are now prepared to draw a positive conclu-