Page:Journal of Speculative Philosophy Volume 17.djvu/70

Rh the other must be definitely adopted. Both cannot be accepted. To attempt it is to show that neither position is understood.

Such is the fact. The reason for it is not far to seek. Bv the sensationalist hypothesis, we know only our feelings; according to the relativity theory, we must know the relation of our feelings to an object; this the feelings cannot give, except by transcending their relativity — except, in short, by ceasing to be feelings. Hume showed once for all that if the sensationalist presuppositions be adopted, the "perceptions" themselves were ultimate and final, and that any supposed reference of them to an object is a fiction to be accounted for as best may be.

An examination of the method by which Mr. Spencer attempts to unite with his sensationalism the position that the existence of an Absolute is known will confirm us in the conclusions just drawn, for we shall see that the best which he can offer is a virtual surrender. His argument was substantially given in the passages cited from him, and is similar to that given in the First Principles for the existence of an absolute object in general. Briefly, it is as follows: "The existence of a Non-relative is unavoidably asserted in every chain of reasoning by which relativity is proved." This is apparently offered as a serious argument in proof of the existence of an absolute object; at least it is all that is offered. Its worth may be made evident by a parallel example. To prove A, we must assume B; by its assumption A is proved. But B is involved in the proof of A; therefore B is also proved. It is evident, or ought to be, that we have here no proof of the existence of either A or B, of the Relative or Non-relative, but simply that there can be no A without B, no Relative without an Absolute — an undoubted fact, but one which leaves the existence of either in as much doubt as before. In truth, it is not a solution of the difficulty, but a statement of it. It says that unless there be an absolute object, our feelings cannot be known as relative; while the question is precisely how is this absolute object known. Mr. Spencer's legitimate conclusions from his argument are either that there is no absolute object, and hence the feelings are not relative, or we do know they are relative, and hence know that there is an absolute object, and have knowledge which is not relative. To attempt, as he does, to prove the existence of one from the assumed existence of the other is to reason in a circle. It can