Page:Journal of Speculative Philosophy Volume 17.djvu/68

Rh and, therefore, ontological conclusions regarding the nature of Being, viz., that it is unrelated to Thought.

Plausible as the theory seems at first sight, by reason of its supposed basis in well-established scientific facts, it is impossible, upon further reflection, to suppress certain questionings. These formulate themselves as follows: How is it possible to assume at the same time the truth of the sensationalist hypothesis and that of the Relativity of Feeling? Are these two doctrines ultimately reconcilable? Does not the possibility of knowing the relativity of our feelings imply an element in knowledge besides these feelings? Could a merely feeling consciousness ever arrive at the knowledge that there were objects as referred to which its feelings were purely relative? In a word : Can a consciousness made up exclusively of feelings which are ex hypothesi relative ever transcend this relativity, and make assertions regarding an absolute object as referred to which alone they could be termed relative?

What I wish to present is some suggestions in answer of this question; and incidentally, if possible, to throw some light upon the ultimate ontological bearings of any theory of the relativity of feeling.

It is to be noticed, first, that this theory assumes that there is an absolute object or objects. There can be no relative except as referred to an Absolute. It is only by assuming that there is something Non-relative that we can know our feelings to be relative. Relative and absolute are correlate terms, and one without the other is meaningless, or rather impossible. Were it not postulated that there is a Non-relative existence as referred to which our present actual feelings are relative, it is evident that the feelings themselves would be the ultimate and absolute, thus contradicting the hypothesis. There is no need to occupy space in stating these truisms, for, besides their self-evident character, they are admitted, or rather claimed, by the chief modern representative of the doctrine we are examining. Says Mr. Spencer: "The proposition, that whatever we feel has an existence which is relative to ourselves only, cannot be proved, nay, cannot even be intelligibly expressed, without asserting directly, or by implication, an external existence which is not relative to ourselves." . . . The hypothesis "that the active antecedents of each primary feeling exist independently of consciousness is the only thinkable