Page:Journal of Speculative Philosophy Volume 16.djvu/260

Rh Scholium. It will now be immediately seen that we have arrived at a denial of one of Spinoza's fundamental conclusions — viz., the existence of finite things as modes or accidents of God. It has not been sufficiently pointed out, I think, how surreptitiously Spinoza introduces this conception. It will be found in Prop. XXVIII, where he states that any particular thing which is finite, and has a determined existence, cannot exist or be determined to action except it be so determined by another finite object similarly determined, and so on infinitely. But it will be noticed that this is a conditional judgment, stating only that if there are finite things, they are so determined. But the very question is: are there such finite objects? and Spinoza only assumes that. He has made his synthetic judgment only by smuggling in one of the very things to be accounted for. The question as to how finite objects are determined possesses no relevancy or validity until it is shown that finite objects can exist at all. But Spinoza proceeds as if his conditional judgment possessed validity not only in its conclusion, but also with regard to its predicate — the existence of finite things. In short, he begs the whole question, and the greater part of his second book rests ultimately on this petitio. An examination of the demonstration of this 28th Prop, will show what conclusion Spinoza ought to have arrived at regarding the existence of the predicate of his major premise. He first shows, by reference to previous propositions, that whatever has been determined has been so determined by God, and that a finite thing cannot be produced from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, nor from any attribute modified with a modification which is eternal and infinite. Hence, he concludes, it must be produced by some modification which is finite. In other words, the condition of a finite thing is a finite thing, and so regressively in an infinite series. In other words, again, the existence of finite things is not accounted for at all; it is only assumed. The conclusion he should have drawn is the following: A finite thing, if it exist, must depend upon another finite, and so on forever. Hence God, since he is infinite, could never cause a finite thing; but since he is the cause of everything, no finite thing could be caused at all, or have existence. Hence the hypothesis is false. That Spinoza did not see that this was the only conclusion to be logically drawn from his arguments, shows how completely his mind was preoccu-