Page:Journal of Speculative Philosophy Volume 16.djvu/216

Rh solution of sceptical doubts." In a somewhat analogous manner we would attempt to render explicit the metaphysical assumptions (i. e., assumptions regarding the real nature of things) latent in all materialism, and, by showing the relation of these fundamental assumptions to materialism itself, show the self-destructive character of every scheme of this kind — whether actual or possible.

What is materialism? It is that theory which declares that matter and its forces adequately account for all phenomena — those of the material world, commonly so called, and those of life, mind, and society. It declares that not only the content of mind, but that which we call mind itself, is determined by matter. We notice first, then, that it is absolutely monistic. But one substance exists — matter. All phenomena of mind are really phenomena of matter. The intellect is a function of the brain and its subordinate nervous organs. The laws of matter are therefore the laws of mind. Mental phenomena are expressible in terms of material. And since all material phenomena are expressible in terms of the atom and molecule (or whatever names be given to the ultimate forms of matter), therefore all mental are similarly expressible. The ultimate form of matter contains, then, implicitly, all phenomena of mind and society. In short, the coarsest form of matter with which you can begin, as well as the highest organism with which you end, must contain all emotion, volition, and knowledge, the knowing subject and its relations. Beginning, then, with a strictly monistic theory, and keeping directly in the line of materialistic reasoning, we have ended with the conclusion that the ultimate form of matter has dualistic "mind" and "matter" properties. Nor is there any escape from this conclusion on a materialistic basis. Therefore on its physical or constructive side we find such a theory suicidal.

To be sure, a materialist might reply that ultimately the "matter"-molecular-property accounted for and caused the "mind"-molecular-property, but proof, or suggestion of proof, or suggestion as to method of finding proof, all are equally absent. If a materialist were to say that this double-sided substance is what he means by matter, we could only reply that he is playing with words — that it is just as much mind as it is matter.

We have now to consider the strictly metaphysical assumptions of materialism.